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Imagining the thinking machine: Technological myths and 
the rise of Artificial Intelligence 
 
Abstract: 
This article discusses the role of technological myths in the development of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) technologies from 1950s to the early 1970s. It shows how the rise of AI 
was accompanied by the construction of a powerful cultural myth: the creation of a 
thinking machine, which would be able to perfectly simulate the cognitive faculties of the 
human mind. Based on a content analysis of articles on Artificial Intelligence published 
in two magazines, the Scientific American and the New Scientist, which were aimed at a 
broad readership of scientists, engineers, and technologists, three dominant patterns in 
the construction of the AI myth are identified: (1) the recurrence of analogies and 
discursive shifts, by which ideas and concepts from other fields were employed to 
describe the functioning of AI technologies; (2) a rhetorical use of the future, imagining 
that present shortcomings and limitations will shortly be overcome; (3) the relevance of 
controversies around the claims of AI, which we argue should be considered as an 
integral part of the discourse surrounding the AI myth. 
 
 
Introduction 
As historians of media and technology have shown, a new technology is always a field 
onto which a broad range of hopes and fears are projected (Corn, 1986; Sturken et al., 
2004; Natale and Balbi, 2014). With the emergence of new media studies as a field of 
enquiry, scholars addressed the cultural discourses surrounding digital technologies in 
terms of “imaginaire” (Flichy, 2007) or “modern myths” (Mosco, 2004). As happened 
with previous communication technologies, the public discourse on digital media such 
as personal computers, e-readers, smartphones, and the Internet, is strongly informed 
by speculations, fantasies, and references to the future (Boddy, 2004; Ballatore, 2014).  
What we call “new media,” however, have a long history, whose study is 
necessary to understand today’s digital culture (Park et al., 2011). This article aims to 
contribute to this endeavour by illuminating the emergence of a crucial component of 
the digital imaginary: the speculations and fantasies about Artificial Intelligence (AI), 
which characterized the development of computing technologies during its early 
inception. It focuses on the emergence from the 1950s to the early 1970s of the AI 
myth, broadly defined as the ensemble of beliefs about digital computer as thinking 
machines, as a key moment in which to study the patterns characterizing the 
construction of technological myths and the digital imaginary. Based on a content 
analysis of articles on Artificial Intelligence published in two magazines, the Scientific 
American and the New Scientist, we identified three dominant patterns in the 
construction of the AI myth: (1) the recurrence of analogies and discursive shifts, by 
which ideas and concepts from other fields were employed to describe the functioning 
of AI technologies; (2) a rhetorical use of the future, imagining that present 
shortcomings and limitations will shortly be overcome; (3) the relevance of controversies 
around the claims of AI, which we argue should be considered as an integral part of the 
discourse surrounding the AI myth. The recognition of these patterns may provide 
useful hints for examining the rise not only of the specific AI myth, but also of 
technological myths constructed in other contexts.  
The presence of controversies since the early history of AI, in particular, is 
revealing of the dynamics through which technological myths emerge and proliferate. 
Pointing to the key role of controversy in fields such as parapsychology, we argue that 
skepticism and criticism added to AI’s capacity of attracting attention and space in 
scientific debates and in the public arena. The AI myth originated and developed not 
only as the result of the discourse produced by those who professed to believe in the 
possibility of building a thinking machine, but rather through a dialogic relationship 
which involved supporters as well as critics of this vision. The functional role of 
controversies helps to explain the persistence of the myth, which continues to center on 
the same overarching questions and tropes characterizing early debates on AI. 
By examining each of these patterns in the context of early AI research, this 
article has three main goals. First, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of the 
key features of the rise of AI and its cultural impact. Second, it aims to provide a 
relevant case study for the analysis the rhetorical and discursive strategies 
accompanying the emergence of technological myths. Third, our analysis also points to 
the necessity to revaluate claims about the history of AI. In particular, we contrast the 
simplistic view according to which the rhetoric of the AI myth in popular culture and the 
public sphere was counteracted by the computer scientists’ attempt to provide an 
accurate image of the potential and the problems of these technologies. We 
demonstrate, on the contrary, that the basic tenets of the AI myth can be found in the 
interventions of key researchers of the field, published in magazines such as the 
Scientific American (SA) and the New Scientist (NS). 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, we discuss 
technological myths as useful frameworks to discuss techno-scientific developments. 
Second, after having briefly described the usefulness of choosing SA and NS to conduct 
our survey, we discuss the three main rhetorical and discursive patterns (analogies, 
projector futures, and controversy) characterizing the emergence of the AI myth since 
the early 1950s. In the conclusion, we contend that the discourses set in motion by AI 
represent a powerful technological myth that still deeply influences and shapes the 
current digital imaginary. 
 
Technological myths 
What is a “technological myth,” and why do we employ this concept to re-frame the 
emergence of AI? The term “myth” resonates widely in the foundations of European 
cultural and media studies, particularly in the intellectual legacy of French semiotician 
Roland Barthes, who described “modern mythologies” as the dominant cultural 
ideologies of our time, at the core of  our relationship to technology (Barthes, 1957). 
More recently, Vincent Mosco (2004: 3) stated that “myths are stories that animate 
individuals and societies by providing paths to transcendence that lift people out of the 
banality of everyday life.” In contemporary societies, these paths are often embodied by 
technologies such as digital computers and the Internet, pointing us to a “digital 
sublime.” In a similar vein, Dourish and Bell (2011) in their study on ubiquitous 
computing define technological myths as powerful “organising visions” on how a new 
technology will fit in the world.  
As Mosco underlines, the theoretical advantage in using this term in relation to 
digital technologies is connected to the fact that, despite the popular pejorative usage of 
the term “myth,” technological myths are not necessarily untruthful and deceitful. More 
precisely, their status of truth or falsity does not interfere with their nature of myths. As 
he puts it, myths “are not true or false, but living or dead” (Mosco 2004: 3). In this 
sense, it is not important if a belief corresponds or not to reality, but rather what it 
reveals about the cultural context from which it originated. A living technological myth 
may have deep effects, even if its tenets turn out to be grossly incorrect. Indeed, this is 
coherent with the characterization of the AI myth provided by information scientist 
Hamid Ekbia, who defined it as the “embodiment of a dream–a kind of dream that 
stimulates inquiry, drives action, and invites commitment, not necessarily an illusion or 
mere fantasy” (Ekbia 2008: 2).  
The fact that popular narratives and representations of technology may or may 
not correspond to actual events has, as argued elsewhere (Natale 2016: 440-43), an 
important methodological implication for scholars interested in the study of technological 
myths: all technological myths have to be taken in consideration and researched in the 
same way, notwithstanding considerations about their accuracy or truthfulness. To use 
an expression conceptualized within the history and sociology of science, research into 
technological myths requires the application of the principle of symmetry, according to 
which the same type of causes should explain both “true” and “false” beliefs (Bloor 
1976). 
How does a technological myth become one that affects culture and society? A 
potential answer to this question lies in the narrative character of myths. Approaches to 
storytelling (e.g. Cavarero 2000) have shown that one of the characteristic of narratives 
is its capacity to circulate, following narrative patterns that are repeated again and 
again. The same applies to technological myths, whose capacity to become influential in 
specific societies and cultures is closely related to their nature of narrative tropes that 
are repeated and circulated over and over again, and are used in multiple contexts to 
represent the functioning, impact and promise of technology (Natale 2016; Ballatore and 
Natale 2016). 
The early history of AI is deeply intertwined with the emergence of a technological 
myth, centred around the possibility of creating thinking machines by using the tools 
provided by digital computing. C. Dianne Martin (1993) has discussed a prominent 
aspect of the imaginary surrounding computers, i.e. the vision of the computer as an 
“awesome thinking machine.” During the early years of the digital revolution, primarily in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, a large segment of public opinion came to see the emergent 
computers as “intelligent brains, smarter than people, unlimited, fast, mysterious, and 
frightening” (Martin 1993: 122). Martin’s contention, based on a body of poll-based 
sociological evidence and content analysis of newspapers, is that mainstream media 
journalists shaped the public imagination of early computers through misleading 
metaphors and technical exaggerations. By contrast, according to Martin, computer 
scientists attempted to counteract this narrative and to exaggerations about the new 
devices (129). As computers moved into the workplace and into the daily lives of 
workers in the early 1970s, claims Martin, the myth of the awesome computing machine 
lost part of its credibility, but still affected a large segment of the American population. 
Two decades later, although further reduced, the myth was still present, particularly in 
its negative forms. Yet, Martin’s analysis downplays the importance of such myths not 
only among the general public, but among technologists and researchers in computer 
science. As a result, the role of the AI field in establishing these beliefs is left 
unaccounted for, a gap that we fill in the next sections. As we will show, a content 
analysis of magazines were computer scientists published articles aims at the popular 
public shows that the myth of AI was animated not only by journalists, but also by 
researchers who worked within the AI framework.  
 
The construction of the AI myth: A content analysis 
As Ortoleva (Ortoleva 2009: 2) notes, technological myths condition not only the 
perception of technology within the public, but also “the professional culture of those 
who have produced the technical innovations and helped their development.” In this 
sense, in order to understand the AI myth it is essential to look also at the professional 
and techno-scientific milieux of technologists beyond the inner circle of AI scientists. For 
this purpose, we carried out preliminary research on the period of study (1950–1975) to 
identify significant magazines where the development of the discipline was widely 
discussed also at a technical level. This thematic inspection was conducted on a 
sample of articles containing the words computer, cybernetics, and intelligence. As a 
result we selected two widely-read magazines, the U.S.-based Scientific American (SA) 
and the British New Scientist (NS), while we did not identify enough thematic relevance 
in others, such as Communications of the ACM and Popular Mechanics.  
Although far from comprehensive, this material provides insight on how the 
results and the promises of AI research were presented to an informed readership. In 
fact, these magazines were – and still are – aimed at a broad readership of scientists 
and engineers. Discussing techno-scientific innovation across disciplines, they can be 
used as a proxy to investigate the visions, fears, desires and fantasies triggered by AI 
research, and to obtain clues about how an entire society debated the introduction of a 
new medium. Crucially, these magazines were a platform where key researchers in the 
AI field published articles aimed at a broader readership than scientific papers, and 
through which they were able to contribute to wider discussions about the potential and 
the future of AI.  
Our use of these sources follows a methodological proposal for studying the 
history of media and technology that was developed by media historian Carolyn Marvin. 
By examining magazines that mainly targeted expert readers and to which professionals 
and engineers contributed articles and letters, Marvin documented the way these 
groups, whose ranks included scientists, electrical engineers, but also cadres of 
operatives from machine tenders to telegraph operators, directed their efforts in the 
engineering, improvement, and promotion of the new media of their age (Marvin, 1988). 
A further benefit of employing this approach is that it provides an opportunity for 
comparison and corroboration with other research in media history and new media 
studies employing popular scientific magazines as sources to unveil the dynamics of 
representations and myth-making in the reception of new media. For instance, 
Vanobberghen (2010) has used Marvin’s methodology to explore reactions to the 
introduction of radio in a Belgian radio amateur magazine. For what concerns digital 
media, Stevenson (2016) has recently unveiled patterns of myth-making in the 
examination of what he calls “belief in the new” by looking at how cybercultural 
magazines Mondo 2000 and Wired contributed to the construction of mythical narratives 
about Internet and the Web. 
Following Marvin’s approach, we undertook a close reading of articles in the SA 
and NS that addressed issues and concepts relevant to the AI field, such as 
cybernetics, systems theory, computational linguistics, operations research, and 
automata theory. In the case of SA, we obtained 1,240 articles from the magazine’s 
index, while for NS, we screened all issues from the first issue of the magazine in 1956 
to 1975, identifying about 600 articles. This corpus was then analysed, and about 100 
highly relevant articles per magazine were selected for close reading. This thematic 
analysis led us to identify three recurring themes (analogies, future orientation, and 
controversies) as central in the corpus across the two magazines. 
Beside its strengths, our methodology also has limitations that should be taken 
into full account. First, it is impossible to identify with precision the readership of SA and 
NS across twenty-five years. Yet, although their readership was probably broad and 
diversified, studies made during the same time frame confirm at least for the case of SA 
that the magazine targeted especially expert readers (Funkhouser 1967). Second, and 
conversely, since the construction of technological myths is performed within the public 
sphere, one might wonder if the SA and NS readership might be instead too limited to 
account for such phenomenon. Yet, as we pointed out in our discussion of the 
relationship between technological myths and narrative, technological myths entail the 
construction of narrative tropes that circulate within a number of contexts in the public 
sphere (Natale 2016). In this regard, magazines with a strong focus on science and 
technology constitute useful resources to identify contexts where technological myths 
are constructed and made available to be repeated and disseminated also in other 
contexts and through other channels.  
Analytic philosopher John Searle proposed a broadly discussed distinction 
between weak and strong AI. “Strong AI,” in Searle’s view, purports to devise general, 
human-like intelligence. “Weak AI,” on the other hand, aims at creating highly 
specialized tools that mimic specific cases of intelligent human behaviour (Searle, 
1980). John Haugeland (1985) labelled the Strong AI approach “Good Old-Fashioned 
Artificial Intelligence” (GOFAI), which dominated the field until the 1970s. While weak AI 
applications are ubiquitous and go largely unnoticed, the AI myth emerged around the 
possibility of strong AI. In the magazines considered in our case study, the emergence 
of AI was discussed as an innovation that promised not only exciting applications, but 
also drastic changes in the relationship between humans and machines.  
The examination of how AI was represented to the readers of Scientific American 
and the New Scientist reveals three main patterns that characterized the construction of 
the AI myth. The first pattern is based on a practice that we propose to call “discursive 
shift,” by which concepts and ideas from other fields and contexts are used as analogies 
to describe concepts in AI. The second pattern is based on the construction of a 
mythical future, by which goals that are not met by AI at its present state are projected 
into the future, turning the shortcomings of AI research into potential developments. 
Finally, the third pattern is the recurring presence of controversies about the claims of 
AI, which, as we will see, played a constitutive and instrumental role in the construction 
of the AI myth. Let us see more closely how these different patterns and strategies 
worked and how they informed the representation of AI research within the public 
sphere. 
 
Discursive shifts and analogies 
The first pattern characterizing the construction of the AI myth is the recurrence of 
discursive shifts by which concepts and categories from other fields and disciplines are 
adapted to describing the functioning of computing technologies. Hamid Ekbia points 
out a fundamental tension in AI history between science and engineering. AI pioneers 
have engaged in engineering, scientific, and discursive practices, through a number of 
paradigms (Ekbia 2008: 5). The discursive practices entailed linking the workings of 
engineering artifacts, such as computer programs and automated devices, to broad 
scientific claims on the human mind, intelligence and behavior, relying on daring 
analogies between humans, animals, and machines. While the usage of analogies is 
widespread in scientific discourses and is not unique to this field (Bartha, 2013), it is 
particularly prominent  in the transdisciplinary research approach adopted by AI 
researchers.  
 Although some authors trace its foundations to the roots of Western philosophy 
in a teleological manner (McCorduck, 1979; Russell et al., 2010), AI sprang up in the 
middle 20th century at the junction of cybernetics, control theory, operations research, 
psychology, and new-born computer science. American neurophysiologist Warren 
McCulloch and logician Walter Pitts published in 1943 “A logical calculus of the ideas 
immanent in nervous activity” (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943), formulating a mathematical 
model of neural activity. Their theory brought together seminal work in logic by Rudolf 
Carnap, David Hilbert, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred N. Whitehead, and the computability 
theories by Alonzo Church and Alan Turing. In 1948, Wiener published “Cybernetics”, a 
best-selling monograph that widely disseminated the idea of intelligent machines 
(Wiener, 1948).  
In 1950, on the other side of the Atlantic, British mathematician Alan Turing 
published the paper “Computing machinery and intelligence”, in which he outlined 
several influential ideas such as natural language processing, machine learning, and 
genetic computing. This paper also described the much-discussed Turing test, in which 
the intelligence of a machine is assessed in its ability to produce a plausible 
conversation indistinguishable from that of a human (Turing, 1950). In this phase, the 
computer as a metaphor for the mind gained credibility, along with the centrality of 
information as a core element of reality (Floridi 2008).  
While the development of cybernetics is usually associated with the Macy 
Conferences in New York, the formal birth of AI can be located in another academic 
conference, the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence, held in 
1956 in New Hampshire. The conference was conceived as an attempt to “find how to 
make machines use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems 
now reserved for humans, and improve themselves” (McCarthy, 2006). In this sense, 
from its inception, AI exhibited the ambitious goal of integrating diverse research areas 
towards the implementation of human intelligence in general, applicable to any domain 
of human activity such as language, vision, and problem solving, which fell outside the 
somewhat narrow scope of control theory and operations research. As a consequence, 
AI technologies were often described in the SA and the NS with terms that usually apply 
to human or animal behavior. This resulted in discursive shifts by which concepts 
migrated from different contexts through analogical arguments, carrying with them their 
own cultural associations and meanings, and often resulting in misleading cross-domain 
translations (Ekbia 2008: 5). 
The articles and commentaries published in the SA and the NS often focused on 
the analogy between the computer and the brain, and between machines and biological 
life. In a 1950 article for SA, W. Grey Walter noted that “there is an intense modern 
interest in machines that imitate life,” and even suggested that “engineers who have 
designed our great computing machines adopted this system without realizing that they 
were copying their own brains” (Walter 1950: 43). Analogously, the Hungarian-American 
mathematician John George Kemeny observed that the human brain could be itself 
compared to a machine. According to his view,  
 
a normal human being is like the universal machine. Given enough time, he can 
learn to do anything. (...) (T)here is no conclusive evidence for an essential gap 
between man and a machine. For every human activity we can conceive of a 
mechanical counterpart. (Kemeny, 1955) 
 
 The comparison between artificial and biological life could go so far as to include 
elements of humanity that surpassed the boundaries of mere rational thinking, to 
include feelings and emotions. In 1971, for instance, an article in the NS was titled 
“Japanese Robot Has Real Feeling.” By reading the article with more attention, one 
could understand that the matter of the experiments was not so much human emotions, 
but rather the capacity of a robot to simulate tactile perception by gaining information 
about an object through contact (Anon., 1971). Playing with the semantic ambiguity of 
the words feeling/feelings, and alluding to human emotions well beyond basic tactile 
stimuli, the author added a considerable amount of sensationalism to his report. Other 
common attempts to anthropomorphize computers and robots were based on 
references to children, whose behaviour and learning strategies were regarded by some 
as a promising way to address the question of how a computer could learn through 
experiences and trial-and-error (Robertson 1975; see also Selfridge & Neisser 1960). 
Similar discursive shifts appear often in many other reports on AI research published in 
the SA and the NS, the most common being the idea that machines can “think,” which 
ultimately turned the focus from computing technologies to the discussion of 
psychological issues, such as what does it mean to think or to perceive (e.g. Selfridge & 
Neisser 1960; Kemeny 1955; Walter 1950). Concepts from fields such as medicine 
(Anon., 1960), developmental psychology (Robertson, 1975) and biology (Moore, 1964), 
among other fields, were appropriated and absorbed into the AI discourses. 
As studies in the history of technology have shown, the construction of semantic 
fields is often instrumental in the constructions of disciplinary fields and communities of 
researchers that work under a common paradigm (Kline, 2006; Oldenziel, 2006). As 
observed by Ruth Oldenziel (2006: 478), “words serve as weapons to frame the social 
realities in which some communities are invited to participate and others are not.” The 
introduction and adaptation of new concepts helps in the creation of shared meaning 
that is entailed in boundary work (Gieryn, 1983). In the case of AI, discursive shifts that 
employed concepts and keywords from different contexts provided ground for the 
creation of shared meaning within the communities of scientists and engineers involved 
in AI research. The analogies blurred the boundary between the human mind and 
machines, contributing to the emergence of particular expectations and imaginaries 
regarding the future of AI.  
 
Projecting the future 
The second pattern characterizing the construction of the AI myth is the strong reliance 
on claims about future developments of the field. Predictions and visions of the future 
are one of the main ways in which mythical ideas about technologies substantiate into 
particular cultural and social imaginaries (Natale, 2014). As historians of technology 
have shown, future-oriented discourse in techno-scientific environment may contribute 
to shift the emphasis from the present state of research towards an imagined prospect 
in which the technology will be successfully implemented. Such “sociotechnical 
projectory” contributes to create a community of researchers, introducing a shared 
objective or endpoint that informs and organizes the work of scientists, technologists 
and engineers involved in such community (Messeri and Vertesi, 2015).1  
In the case of AI research, the call to future developments was a common staple by 
which present shortcomings in the applications of AI research were redirected towards a 
                                            
1 The case of Moore’s Law is a good example within the field of computer science for the ways 
projections of future accomplishments may also act as an incitation for specific research communities to 
project their expectations towards certain standards and, interestingly, also within defined boundaries. 
See, among others, Brock and Moore (2006). 
seemingly proximate future in which these failings would be overcome. Numerous 
articles in SA and NS explicitly addressed future developments: writers reported on the 
potential applications of AI in fields such as transportation (Glanville, 1964; Lighthill, 
1964), robotics (Taylor, 1960), and medicine (Anon., 1960), among many others. 
Predictions often included estimates about the lapse of time required to the 
development of new fields of applications: for instance, Glenville (1964: 684) was 
confident that “the control by a single computer of the road traffic in the busier parts of 
our cities” would be “without doubt, be in operation within twenty years.” Even when 
current research was presented, contributors frequently highlighted their impact in terms 
of future opportunities. In discussing the results of his research, for instance, the 
director of the Department of Machine Intelligence at Edinburgh University Donald 
Michie acknowledged that “no single technique is going to bring about magic 
transformation,” but at the same time suggested that “the consequences of effective 
methods for representing chess knowledge could be great” (Michie 1972: 371-72).2  
The initial swift achievements in several areas characterised what AI historian 
Crevier (1993) defined the ‘golden years’ of AI. Such encouraging short-term advances 
brought with them predictions about the development of this field that were exceedingly 
optimistic, fuelling the plausibility of the myth of AI. Formal games, such as checkers 
and chess, provided a fertile test bed for AI applications. Since 1952, Arthur L. Samuel 
at the IBM research department had been working on a program that was able to learn 
how to play checkers, choosing promising moves based on a heuristic score of the 
                                            
2 On the role of computer chess software in shaping research agendas and expectations within the 
AI community, see Ensmenger (2012). 
pieces positions on the board (Samuel, 1959). Associated with high intelligence in 
popular culture, chess attracted notable contributions from leading AI scientists (Newell 
et al., 1958). In an article published in the NS, Donald Michie dedicated a section to the 
topic of “the future,” in which he attempted to examine the prospective improvements in 
the methods to reproduce expert knowledge in chess (Michie, 1972). Others speculated 
that writing chess programs might result in the future in a better understanding of how a 
human brain actually works (Zobrist and Carlson, 1973). Eventually, as an article in the 
SA pointed out as early as 1952, the application of research on games could open the 
way for “future automatic machines which will make decisions in business and military 
operations” (King, 1952: 147). Yet, in the early seventies, an article in the NS had to 
admit that, despite some encouraging progress, a conference held in Britain had proved 
that there was still a long time to go before a computer capable of beating an 
international chess master could be designed (Anon., 1973). It was only in 1996 that a 
chess computer program, Deep Blue, succeeded to win an established grandmaster, 
Garry Kasparov (Campbell et al., 2002). 
Predictions about the future were not only a way to imagine the potential of AI 
research, but also a specific area of technological development within the field. In 1958, 
the NS reported about the possibility of using computers that could make effective 
forecasts. Although many improvements in this context have been effectively made in 
the subsequent decades, the article suggested practical applications that were to be 
developed yet. As the magazine reported, the Russian scientist Leonid Krushinski had 
claimed to have discovered a new type of reflex, whose study “would help 
mathematicians to create machines capable of effecting forecasts on a scale 
inaccessible to the human brain” (Anon., 1958). Some years later, the magazine also 
dedicated a long series of articles to technological forecasting, collected under the 
science-fiction-like title of “The World in 1984.” In this context, the examination of many 
predictions, such as how roads and traffic (Glanville, 1964) or the aviation network 
(Lighthill, 1964) would be twenty years later, emphasised the potential of the use of 
intelligent computers to perform duties usually executed by human workers. Further 
subjects of prediction focusing on AI-related technologies included the applications of 
automation in the farming industry (Morgan, 1961), the designing of techniques to 
mechanize haute couture (Macqueen, 1963), and the construction and workings of an 
intelligent chemical plant (Ridenour, 1952). In 1960, an article pointed out that AI might 
even help discover a cure for cancer. This hopeful claim was based on the 
consideration that “cancer could be defined, cybernetically, as an error in the controlling 
system; that is to say, as misinformation or an error in a feedback system” (Anon., 
1960). 
It is interesting to note that, similarly to the discursive shifts discussed above, this 
second pattern also entails a shift between different contexts: the results of AI research 
are in fact moved forward from the horizon of the present to the horizon of the future. 
This rhetorical move, which often characterizes techno-scientific research in new and 
promising areas (Borup et al., 2006), is a recurring pattern of the way AI research was 
represented in magazines such as the SA and the NS during the period examined. The 
construction of the AI myth involved an act of conceptual shift by which concepts and 
ideas from different fields were translated and applied to the description of AI research, 
or results in AI research were moved from the examination of the present state towards 
the imagination of future horizons and developments. 
 
The role of controversies 
The third main pattern emerging from our analysis of the construction of the AI myth in 
the pages of the NS and the SA is the strong presence of controversies regarding the 
claims of (strong) AI. Since at least the early 1960s – in a period of prevailing optimism 
regarding the prospects of AI – skeptics and critics actively challenged the community, 
rejecting optimistic predictions as groundless and pointing to the conceptual problems 
surrounding the core tenets of AI (Moore, 1964; Ulam, 1964). In both the NS and the 
SA, enthusiastic claims about the potential of AI technologies came hand in hand with 
critical interventions. Researchers were particular skeptical or nuanced about the 
possibility that a computer might equal the functioning of a human mind, mainly 
because of technical limitations (e.g. Voysey 1974; Albus & Evans 1976). American 
physicist Louis N. Ridenour calculated that, given the present state of computer 
technology, if a vacuum-tube as complex as the brain was made, it would require “a 
skyscraper to house it, the power of Niagara to operate it and the full flow of water over 
the falls to keep it cool” (Ridenour, 1951: 17). Researchers also realized very early after 
the emergence of the AI field that the dream of a thinking machine had started much 
before the development of cybernetics, but had not delivered convincing results thus far 
(Moore, 1964). Concerns about the possible consequences of automation in fields such 
as labour were also expressed, pinpointing the ethical and social problems involved in 
the applications and developments of AI (Voysey, 1975). 
This tendency to invite controversies and criticism did not abandon the field 
throughout its development. At different times, authors, commentators, and scientists 
embraced, qualified or rejected the AI myth. In the inner circle of AI research, although a 
certain consensus on the core tenets of the discipline existed, critics rejected the 
assumptions of the discipline as simplistic and philosophically naïve (e.g. Taube 1961).  
As early AI projects relied on abstract, disembodied symbol processing, carried out 
through formal languages, the lack of a physical and perceptual dimension to ground 
reasoning was soon identified by AI critics as one of its main methodological flaws. 
Notably, phenomenologist and Heideggerian scholar Hubert Dreyfus launched open 
attacks on AI, which resulted in his ostracism from the research community (Dreyfus 
1965, 1992). Between the absolute belief in the AI myth of Minsky and Dreyfus’ radical 
scepticism, a spectrum of fluid and nuanced positions existed. While some rejected the 
central metaphor of the brain as a computer as unsound, other scientists still accepted 
the possibility of strong AI (Lighthill, 1973). 
How can we reconsider the role of controversies in the construction of the AI myth? 
Historians of AI have most often privileged a “rise and fall” narrative to describe the rise 
of the paradigm in the 1950s-1960s and its apparent demise in the following two 
decades (Crevier, 1993; Russell et al., 2010). According to this established narrative, as 
AI researchers obtained early successes, unrealistic expectations spread and sustained 
the belief that fully-fledged thinking machines were on the verge of being created. The 
hype hit its peak in the late 1960s. At the beginning of the 1970s, the gap between the 
real outcomes of AI research and the wild visions of thinking machines resulted in the 
so-called “AI winter,” damaging the credibility of AI enthusiasts, and resulting in a 
general loss of credibility and funding. The narrative of hype and disillusionment, while 
adequate with respect to research funding cycles, fails to adequately capture how the AI 
myth has always been ─not only during or since its “winter,” but also during its “golden 
age” and in the most recent developments─ a field characterized by a high degree of 
controversy around the question if a thinking machine is possible or not. Criticism was 
not or, at least, not only a consequence of the hype; it was an element that entered into 
and shaped the AI myth since its very beginning. Rather than framing controversies 
within a rise-and-fall narrative, we might therefore interrogate if and to what extent they 
were a functional and integral component to the construction of the AI myth. Indeed, 
although scientific controversies are often regarded as an element that hinders the 
development of a scientific theory or field (Besel, 2011; Ceccarelli, 2011), scholars in 
history of science and technology ─most notably, Thomas Gieryn (1983) and, within the 
Social Construction Of Technology (SCOT) framework, Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker 
(1987)─ have underlined the functional character of controversies in scientific and 
technological innovations (see also Engelhardt & Caplan 1987). Adopting a similar 
approach may be useful to comprehend how controversies have been a structural 
component of the AI field.  
The myth of the thinking machine emerged as a body of claims, theories and 
technologies that constitutionally invited skepticism and criticism. Historians of AI have 
sometimes argued that the heightened tendency to stimulate controversies was 
engrained in the very name given to the discipline. Russell et al. (2010) suggests that 
the term “Artificial Intelligence”, coined by John McCarthy in 1955, contributed to 
heighten expectations to an unhealthy degree, explicitly setting the target of an artificial 
human-like intelligence. 
Extensive and apparently endless controversy, observable throughout the history 
of the AI, also characterizes other highly debated contexts, including parapsychology, a 
field of inquiry concerned with the investigation of so-called “paranormal” phenomena.3 
Addressing the case of fringe science, sociologist of science David J. Hess proposes 
that parapsychologists and their opponents are not mere antagonists, but rather 
participants in a wider discourse whose very existence is based on the incessant 
controversy that surround paranormal phenomena. He notes that skepticism is 
constantly evoked not only by the ones who criticize the irrationalism of fringe science, 
but by the parapsychologists themselves, who proclaim their skepticism against the 
corporate world, official science, the medical establishment, as well as against the 
claims made by other parapsychologists, New Agers, or spiritualists. In a context where 
“scientists engage in boundary-work to distinguish science from nonscience, but also 
(…) a variety of other groups construct boundaries (and consequently themselves as 
groups) not only with respect to more orthodox scientists and skeptics but with respect 
to each other,” controversies provide the ground and the condition for existence of the 
field (Hess 1993: 145). 
Looking at the case of how religious beliefs are assessed and challenged in the 
public arena may also provide useful interpretative tools for addressing the role of 
controversies in technological myths. Indeed, Robert Geraci (2008) has argued for the 
                                            
3 It is worth noting, in this regard, that some strands of AI, such as singularity, have been often 
regarded by ritics as pseudo-science, not differently from parapsychology.  
presence of striking resemblance between the AI myth and religious thinking. Studies in 
religion and media studies have shown that religious belief and practices not only 
coexists with skepticism, but may even require it (Taussig, 1998; Walker, 2013). 
Although science is, of course, very different from religion, the way beliefs are 
simultaneously invited and challenged in such contexts may provide useful keys to an 
understanding of how beliefs in scientific theories can be characterized by similar 
dynamics. It is, in fact, within a dialectic that the AI myth emerged and progressed, 
grounded in the incessant dispute between its opponents and its supporters.  
As we noted at the beginning of this paper, technological myths are defined by their 
capacity to be present and pervasive in a particular society and culture (Mosco, 2004). 
In this sense, controversies are an integral and important part of the myth of the thinking 
machine because they contribute to its liveliness, to its capacity of attracting attention 
and space in scientific debates and the public arena. The controversy on AI was inflated 
and reinforced in the public sphere by the mass media. Jason Delborne (2011) has 
convincingly argued that scientific controversies are a context through which specific 
paradigms, theories and fields construct their audience within the scientific world as well 
as in the public and popular arena. Partly exploiting the allure of the limelight for 
scientists, the popular press shaped through sensationalistic representations of AI 
projects the popular perception of digital computers as “Electronic Super Brains”, even 
“faster than Einstein” (Russell et al. 2010: 9). This tendency is evident also in the pages 
of popular science magazines such as NS and SA, where controversy was one of the 
key ways through which the AI myth was discussed, assessed, and ultimately 
constructed. 
 Conclusion: The rise and persistence of the AI myth  
The analysis presented in this article contributes to the study of the imaginary around 
digital technologies by framing the emergence of AI technologies as a technological 
myth. Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend the present cultural significance of computing 
technologies without considering the impact of AI, which dominated a crucial period of 
their development between the 1950s and the 1970s. Yet, the myth of AI did not cease 
to exercise a strong impact after this period, as the narrative of “AI winters” implied. In 
fact, this myth continues to characterize several aspects of the contemporary imaginary 
connected to new media technologies. Whilst the myth seemed to have exhausted its 
credibility in the 1970s, it was not, by any means dead, and AI has survived many 
winters, finding new surprising avenues and manifestations. While much recent 
scholarship in new media studies has mostly focused on the web as the leading 
technological myth of our age (Flichy, 2007), the symbolic and imaginative importance 
of the computer as a machine that replicates the human mind in our present day is still 
one of the dominant aspects within the narrative of “new media.”  
On the one hand, new computing approaches and technologies re-ignited the 
hope to implement general intelligence and attracted research funding. The wave of 
“expert systems” in the 1980s generated viable and profitable applications, but at the 
same time fostered novel expectations about AI. In the same decade, the Japanese 
launched a new 10-year plan to build intelligent machines called the "Fifth Generation" 
project, followed by equivalent American and British efforts, which all failed (Russell et 
al. 2010: 24-25). Neural networks also experienced a re-birth, generating the so-called 
“connectionist” approach to AI as a major alternative to symbol manipulation. In more 
recent decades, availability of large amounts of data and major increases in computing 
power and storage triggered remarkable advances in the areas of data mining, machine 
learning, and natural language processing, developing earlier AI methods into 
successful research paradigms. 
On the other hand, the myth of AI still exerts its influence well beyond the 
technical sphere, and is an essential component to a strand of philosophy called 
“transhumanism,” whose principal tenet is the possibility of enhancing the human 
condition with advanced technologies, and that has been particularly influential among 
computer technologists since the 1980s (Hayles, 1999). Following Minsky’s 
speculations, robotician Hans Moravec envisages that human life will be superseded by 
intelligent machines by 2040 (Moravec, 1988). Futurist Raymond Kurzweil has 
developed the theory of Technological Singularity, a moment in which AI will have 
overcome human capabilities (Kurzweil, 2005). Extrapolating from alleged exponential 
advances in information technology, Kurzweil imagines an impending radical change in 
civilization, when intelligent machines will merge with humans to unleash 
unprecedented possibilities. More recently, philosopher Nick Bostrom has been 
discussing the risks of super-intelligent agents emerging from AI research (Bostrom, 
2012). Robert M. Geraci has aptly named this strand of dystopian beliefs “Apocalyptic 
AI,” showing that the thinking machines promised by AI provided fertile ground to re-
cast religious dreams of purity, perfection, and immortality, auspicating the “victory of 
intelligent computation over the forces of ignorance and inefficiency,” reaching 
computer-generated heavens (Geraci, 2008). 
Whilst Apocalyptic AI is indeed the most radical manifestation of the myth, the 
myth of AI resurfaces in utopian undertones of more moderate theories. The spread of 
personal computing and networking fuelled a plethora of new technological myths which 
re-cast the myth of AI in novel forms dominated by the idea of network-based collective 
intelligence. What has not occurred on the large and clumsy mainframes of the mid-20th 
century will occur in the context of ubiquitous computing and the densely connected 
communication networks on the 21st century. In this strand of “networking AI,” authors 
follow the utopian visions fostered by previous advances in telecommunications, and 
consider the Internet as the final stage of human interconnectedness, in which 
interactions between individuals and machines increase collective intelligence to 
unprecedented levels. The web is seen as a “global brain” which can bring humans to a 
new level of consciousness (Heylighen, 2004). Media theorist Pierre Lévy 
acknowledges the limitations of traditional AI, and proposes to transform the current 
“opaque global brain” into a collective “Hypercortex” (Levy, 2011). 
The three patterns that we have identified as characterizing the construction of 
the AI myth on the SA and NS in the 1940s-1970s emerge distinctly in contemporary 
versions of the AI myth, too. Discursive shifts continue to epitomize the way AI-related 
research is inserted into a wider imagination that tends to humanize technology as well 
as to connect it with superhuman or even supernatural powers (El Kaliouby and 
Robinson, 2004). Likewise, the rhetorical shift from the examination of the present state 
towards the imagination of future horizons and developments still characterizes 
contemporary AI myths.4 Finally, the controversies about the possibility of creating 
“intelligent machines” is still much living, as the extent of contemporary debate about 
the possibility of AI demonstrates. 
Our examination of the AI myth, therefore, is also meant as an encouragement to 
give more emphasis to the way this cultural vision reverberates in contemporary 
discourses on digital technology and culture. Technological myths that play today a 
paramount role in the discussion of digital media and culture, such as transhumanism 
and singularity, derive much of their claims and tenets from the discourse which 
emerged in the 1940s-1970s in connection to research on AI. Furthermore, the myth of 
AI finds fertile ground in the dream of collective intelligence, in which the idea of the 
thinking machine interacts and is combined in many ways to the imaginary of networked 
communication and the Web (Flichy, 2007). This imaginary is largely based, just like the 
AI myth emerged in the post-war period, on the recurrence of three distinctive patterns: 
the use of ideas and concepts from other fields and contexts to describe the functioning 
of AI technologies, the mingling between examination of present research results with 
the imagination of potential future applications and horizons of research, and the strong 
relevance of controversies in public discussions of the concept and its application.  
As Park, Jankowski and Jones observe, “the history of new media presents us 
with something more significant than merely another opportunity to see familiar 
distinctions being reasserted”; it also provides us with new insights to look at the 
                                            
4 See, among many possible instances, the numerous articles on AI-related technologies which 
appeared in the “Future Thinking” columns featured in the BBC’s website 
(http://www.bbc.com/future/columns/future-thinking). 
present configurations of digital culture (Park et al. 2011: xi). The important role played 
by the myth of AI offers relevant insights to better understand how technological myths 
contribute to shape the social presence of today’s digital media. 
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